Labor Law's Alter Ego Doctrine: The Role of Employer Motive in Corporate Transformations
For over fifty years, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or · Act) 1 has provided employees 2 with the statutory right to choose an exclusive bargaining representative 3 (i.e., a labor union) with whom their employer must bargain collectively. 4 The goal of the bargaining process is a collective bargaining contract agreed to by both the union and the employer. 5 Unfortunately, some employers attempt to disavow their bargaining obligations and valid labor contracts following, or through, a change in corporate form.
The most blatant disavowal of NLRA responsibilities involves an employer motivated by anti-union animus. 6 One example of evasion has been described as follows:
The United Auto Workers ... caustically refers to it as "management's neutron bomb -you eliminate the union workforce, but keep the business intact."
"It" involves a union shop's owners locking the doors, only to move [Vol. 86:1024 uance of the old employer." 14 An employer cannot escape liability " [i] f there was merely a change in name." 15 A subsequent employer found to be the alter ego of its predecessor is not only bound to bargain with its predecessor's union, but is held to the terms of the prior collective bargaining agreement itself. 16 Although the alter ego doctrine is well-settled in cases where an employer's change in corporate form is motivated by anti-union animus or an intent to evade its collective bargaining obligations, corporate transformations also occur for reasons unrelated to animus. The Supreme Court's Southport decision did not address the appropriate role of employer motive in such cases. The courts of appeals are divided on the proper role of motive, and no clear majority favors any particular standard. 17 There are, however, three primary approaches to reviewing NLRB alter ego findings.
Some courts argue that animus is "critical"; the court will not enforce an NLRB alter ego order if the Board has not first found an "intent to evade." 18 A second approach contends that animus is merely "relevant": "[A] finding of employer intent is not essential or prerequisite to imposition of alter ego status. Instead, it is merely one of the relevant factors which the Board can consider, along with the well-established factors of substantial identity of management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision and ownership .... " 19 A third approach, espoused by the Fourth Circuit, finds an alter ego relationship only if (1) the same entity controls the old and new employer; and (2) the employer anticipated a "reasonably foreseeable benefit . . . related to the elimination of its labor obligations."20 The Fourth Circuit based its standard on an analysis of Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. 21 The NLRB itself has not taken a clear position on the appropriate standard, with some members arguing that animus is "relevant, but not prerequisite" to imposing alter ego status, while other members imply that it is "critical." 22 The division among the courts of appeals and the Board is not without practical significance. The increasing number of alter ego cases during the past fifteen years underscores the need for a uniform 14 standard. 23 This Note examines the differing judicial approaches for reviewing NLRB alter ego findings, and concludes that a fundamental problem with all of the current approaches is the unwarranted consideration of motive in varying degrees. This Note proposes a modified "reasonably foreseeable benefit" standard which does not depend in any degree on the employer's motive for changing its corporate form. Part I discusses the origin and evolution of the alter ego doctrine, including its genesis in Southport Petroleum, the well-settled Crawford Door factors, and the related "successorship" doctrine. Part II analyzes the conflict among the federal courts of appeals over the role of employer motive and Supreme Court cases in related areas of labor law. This part maintains that the Fourth Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable benefit" standard provides an excellent foundation for the appropriate standard, and proposes a modified approach in which (1) the Board applies the flexible, seven-factor Crawford Door test; and (2) if it finds that the "new" employer is in reality the same as its predecessor, the Board must then inquire whether the old employer anticipated a "reasonably foreseeable benefit" for any reason. Alter ego status is found only if both prongs of the test are met. 24 Part III examines the policy considerations attendant to accommodating the tension between legitimate employee expectations and an employer's freedom to rearrange its business -and to go out of business -as it sees fit. The modified "reasonably foreseeable benefit" standard proposed in Part II properly defines the bounds of both legit- [Vol. 86:1024 imate employee expectations and employer freedom. Predictability and uniformity are achieved in NLRB decisions without an undue sacrifice in the Board's ability to apply flexibly the Crawford Door factors.
I. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE ALTER EGO DOCTRINE
A. Congress's Broad Brush: The NLRA
The legislative history, and the language of the NLRA itself, state Congress's two broad labor-law objectives -"to promote industrial peace and equality of bargaining power." 25 The way in which Congress sought to accomplish this goal was through "removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest." 26 Two of the NLRA provisions designed for this purpose are applicable to this Note. 27 First, section 8(a)(5) requires an employer to bargain collectively with the representative of its employees. 28 Second, section 8(a)(3) prohibits discrimination in hiring, tenure, or terms and conditions of employment which encourage or discourage union membership. 29 However, neither the legislative history nor the language of the Act addresses the problem of an employer changing its corporate form and potentially escaping from the predecessor employer's NLRA obligations.
Recognizing the impossibility of fashioning a comprehensive set of rules and regulations, Congress gave the NLRB a mandate to carry out its national labor policies and objectives. 30 The Board thus has primary responsibility for deciding whether an unfair labor practice 25 the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has been superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees ...• In an alter ego case, the "new" employer not only terminates the contract, but refuses to bargain with the union altogether, arguing that the union has "ceased to be the representative of the employees." NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) . If the "new" employer is found to be an alter ego, however, it has failed to bargain collectively as defined in § 8(d), and hence violates § 8(a)(5). See also text at note 115 infra. 29. See note 12 supra. 30. NLRA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982), provides in pertinent part: "The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind ... such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." violation has occurred under section 8. 31 A reviewing court must accept "the findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." 32 Because alter ego determinations have been held to be questions of fact, 33 the NLRB's findings are entitled to judicial deference, although such deference does not leave the courts without a significant role in this area. 34 This role, and the interplay of the NLRB and the courts, is the subject of the next section. 35 Given that the lower courts and the NLRB put great weight on the language of the Court's holding, 36 and that Southport was the first and last pronouncement of the Court on this subject, 37 an indepth review of both the facts and the holding of the case is important. This subpart will show that the language of Southport does not support an intent requirement beyond those cases in which an employer clearly intends to evade its bargaining obligations.
B. Filling in the Details
Southport Petroleum was a Texas corporation that had engaged in various unfair labor practices. 38 The Board found violations of sec-31. As noted earlier, the key provision with respect to the alter ego doctrine is NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982) . See note 12 supra. 32. NLRA § lO(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982) . The courts must defer to the Board's expertise where its findings are supported by substantial evidence, even though the reviewing court could "justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) . The primary justification for this deference is that the Board is "one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect." 340 U.S. at 488; see also The shareholders then claimed that, because the predecessor company had been dissolved, the Board's remedial order was invalid. 43 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Board's order on a narrow holding based upon Texas law. 44 The Supreme Court's affirmance was based on a similarly narrow holding. The sole issue before the Court was whether the court of appeals erred in denying Southport's application for leave to adduce additional evidence that the Texas company had dissolved, and was therefore beyond the reach of the Board's remedial order. 45 The Court rejected the shareholders' contention. Speaking for the Court, Justice Jackson stated that the appropriate test was "Whether there was a bqna fide discontinuance and a true change of ownership -which would terminate the duty of reinstatement created by the Board's order -or merely a disguised continuance of the old employer .... " 46 Although this Note refers to "the Board" as though it were a monolithic entity, the NLRB decisionmaking process begins with an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who makes findings of fact, conclusions of law, and rulings based on a hearing. Appeals of the ALJ's decisions are made to the NLRB. The Board's and ALJ's opinions will not be discussed separately unless otherwise noted. Another factor to be considered is the continuity of the work force. If the second employer continues with substantially the same employees, the second employer is more likely to be deemed an alter ego of the first.
For example, in
If, however, the second employer has a substantially different work force than did the first employer, the second employer is more likely to be deemed a mere successor. S9 Continuity of the work force is not, however, a helpful indicator of alter ego status. Although a new work force in an arms-length transaction would not indicate alter ego status, the lack of continuity of the work force in the absence of an arms-length change of ownership could provide excellent evidence that the "new" employer is in reality the alter ego of its predecessor. Taking the Tenth Circuit's analysis to ship and control which is 'substantially identical.'"), enforced sub nom. Goodman Piping Prods., 741 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1984 an extreme, our "neutron bomb" employer 60 could fire its entire work force out of sheer animus, and then make a bootstrap argument that because there is no "continuity of the work force," it is at most required to bargain with the union as a successor employer. 6 I Therefore, continuity of the work force is a better indicator of an unfair labor practice once the employer is identified as an alter ego employer. 62 Additionally, in enunciating its new factor, the Tenth Circuit also skirted the fine line dividing successorship and alter ego doctrines. Indeed, the court's reliance on 62. Assuming the Crawford Door factors are met, both the "critical" and "relevant" approaches would find alter ego status based on the discriminatory firing of the work force. Likewise, an objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach would use the discriminatory firing as evidence that there was a reasonably foreseeable benefit to the old employer which did not actually go out of business. (The distinction between a motive-based and objective standard is that a different result is reached under the motive-based standard when the motive is legitimate.) We discuss "single employer'' and "alter ego" ... as though they were two separate ideas.
In doing so, we adopt the approach of text-writers and digesters, to whose hearts such neat categories are dear.
In fact, what is really happening ..
• is that a number of factors ••• are being treated as relevant to the question whether an employer, formally separate, should be viewed as legally the same as another. Id. at 92-93 (quoting Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 796 F.2d 234, 236 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986)). This Note adopts those "neat categories," which is appropriate given its focus on corporate transformations, which are sequential in time, rather than on the "double-breasting" context, involving coexisting entities. (discussing "double-breasted" employers). Professor Befort has written an excellent and compre· hensive article on the subject. He points out the "failure of the single employer and alter ego doctrines as theoretical bases for evaluating double-breasted operations ... .'' Befort, supra note 66, at 101. Befort proposes a four-part "double-breasting" test addressing "common ownership or continued financial benefit, diversion of unit work, appropriate bargaining unit, and motive.'' Id. He views the motive element as a relevant, but not prerequisite, factor. Id. at 104. Professor Befort's proposed test would help bring coherence to the traditional "double-breasting" cases, and might alleviate some of Congress's current concerns -in 1987 the House of Representatives passed legislation that "would prevent unionized construction companies from setting up separate, nonunionized divisions," Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 1987, § 2, at 15, col. l, although the legislation died in the Senate. Id.
Although this Note does not address the "double-breasting" aspects of the alter ego doctrine, it does discuss and analyze "double-breasting" cases that fall outside of the traditional construction industry context. For example, in NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1986), the predecessor employer, a moving company working both as an independent and as an Atlas Van Lines agent split into two successor companies -one union and one nonunionallegedly in response to an Atlas policy change prohibiting its agents from simultaneously operat· ing independently. See text at notes 136-39 infra. As the ALJ correctly pointed out, however:
While these circumstances may explain the decision to create [the nonunion company] as a separate corporation, they do not explain a totally separate and subsequent decision on [the employer's] part in refusing to apply to [the new company's] employees the terms and conditions of employment which governed their performance of Atlas work prior to the change in corporate structure. Allcoast Transfer, 271 N.L.R.B. 1374, 1379, enforced, 780 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1986). Unlike the motive-based justification (which is nonetheless suspect) of construction employers who must bid on both union and nonunion jobs, there is no motive-based justification in the nontraditional alter ego concepts are often applied, are beyond the scope of this Note. This subpart instead focuses on the "absolute distinction between alter ego concepts ... and so-called successorship cases." 68 The Tenth Circuit's use of "continuity of the work force" 69 as an alter ego criterion provides a reason for discussing the Supreme Court's own distinction between successorship and alter ego concepts and for reviewing the different policy concerns underlying the two doctrines.
The different factual settings and legal consequences of suqcessorship· and alter ego cases are summarized as follows:
[T]he issue of successorship arises only when there is a bona fide purchase or sale, meaning an arm's length relinquishment of control between two independent entities. If the purchaser in a transaction is found to be an alter ego of the selling party, the seller's contractual obligations will be applied to the purchaser/alter ego in their entirety. 70 While an alter ego employer is bound to the terms of its predecessor's collective bargaining contract, an arms-length successor employer 71 is normally subject at most to an obligation to recognize and bargain with the predecessor's union. 72 The different legal consequences illuscase. As long as there is at least a partial cessation of business by the predecessor company, the "foreseeable benefit" approach proposed by this Note, see Part II.C infra, adequately protects employees without resort to Professor Befort's proposed test. The Sixth Circuit itself based its decision entirely on traditional alter ego analysis without reference to the "double-breasting" aspects of the case. 71. There is a dispute over the proper definition of "successor employer." See, e.g., Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 262 n.9 ("There is, and can be, no single definition of 'successor' which is applicable in every legal context. A new employer ... may be a successor for some purposes and not for others."); Note, Bargaining Obligations, supra note 65, at 643 n.129 ("'Successor' is a term of art, although many cases use it as a generic term for all new enterprises."); Note, The Bargaining Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 759, 759 n.l (1975) ("The term 'successor' has often been used to express a legal conclusion that the new employer should be held to certain of the obligations of its predecessor .... For clarity, the term as used [here] will not imply that the new employer is held to any obligations, but will be used merely to refer to the new employer."). This Note adopts the Harvard Law Review Note's use of the term as merely referring to the new employer. Where it is not clear from the context of the discussion, the term "arms-length successor" will be used to indicate a successor employer who is not bound to the terms of the collective bargaining contract of its predecessor.
72. See NLRB v. Burns Intl. Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 281-82 (holding that an employer is not automatically held to the substantive terms of its predecessor's collective bargaining contract, even if it hires a majority of the predecessor's employees). It can be argued, however, that Burns did not involve a "true" successorship case. Justice Rehnquist (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and Powell) argued in dissent that the successorship doctrine is based on "the need to grant some protection to employees from a sudden transformation of their em- [Vol. 86:1024 trate the danger of commingling the two doctrines.
The Tenth Circuit's adoption of "continuity in the work force" as an alter ego criterion erroneously relies on the successorship cases. 13 which held that an armslength successor is not required to arbitrate 74 the predecessor employer's collective bargaining contract unless there is substantial continuity of the work force. 75 There are important distinctions, however, between the arms-length successorship and alter ego cases. The ployer's business that results in the substitution of a new legal entity, not bound by the collectivebargaining contract ... but leaves intact significant elements of the employer's business." 406 U.S. at 301. Such a need is not present when the successor employer acquires none of the predecessor's "tangible or intangible assets,'' 406 U.S. at 305, and the new employer's "only connection with the old employer [was] the hiring of some of the latter's employees." 406 U.S. at 306. Finally, the Court notes: "Particularly in light of the difficulty of the successorship question, the myriad factual circumstances and legal contexts in which it can arise, and the absence of congressional guidance as to its resolution, emphasis on the facts of each case as it arises is especially appropriate." 417 U.S. at 256.
It is thus possible that Professor St. Antoine's distinction of Burns is still valid, and that a contract might be binding on a "true" successor. He maintains that this possibility continues to exist. Interview with Theodore J. St. Antoine, James E. and Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School (Jan. 20, 1988) . If the distinction does exist, this Note's argument for an objective standard is strengthened, because if an arms-length successor can be bound to the terms of its predecessor's contract, a fortiori an alter ego employer with the same ownership and control should be bound to its predecessor's contract regardless of its motive for changing corporate form.
73 For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to recognize that suits arise in two different forums - § 301 arbitration suits initiated in federal district court and unfair labor practice suits initiated in NLRB agency proceedings -and that both are appealable to United States courts of appeals. The forum is not, however, outcome-determinative.
75. 417 U.S. at 262-64.
Court's own language distinguishes the concepts; in Howard Johnson, Justice Marshall writes:
[T]his is not a case where the successor corporation is the "alter ego" of the predecessor, where it is "merely the disguised continuance of the old employer." Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942). Such cases involve a mere technical change in the structure or identity of the employing entity, frequently to avoid the effect of the labor laws, without any substantial change in its ownership or management. In these circumstances, the courts have had little difficulty holding that the successor is in reality the same employer and is subject to all the legal and contractual obligations of the predecessor. 76 It is important to understand that the two doctrines are based on different underlying policies.
The Court's policy concern in the arms-length successorship cases is that "[a] potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund business only if he can make changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor force, ... and nature of supervision." 77 In contrast, the alter ego doctrine focuses on whether the successor "is in reality the same employer." 78 "The same employer," in terms of the Crawford Door criteria, 79 cannot be allowed to escape its contractual obligations by eliminating its union employees and then claiming "no substantial continuity of identity in the work force." 80 Although the following point is unrelated to analyzing the validity of "work force" as an alter ego criterion, one final observation should be made about Justice Marshall's description of the alter ego doctrine in Howard Johnson. He explains that in alter ego cases an employer may "frequently" change its structure to avoid its NLRA duties. This suggests that there may be circumstances involving a corporate transformation not motivated by a desire to avoid labor commitments that should nonetheless result in alter ego status.
The terms "frequently" and "in reality the same employer" both suggest that an objective inquiry into the alter ego status of a successor employer is appropriate. A motive-based standard cannot, however, be so easily dismissed. The uncertainty over the role of motive is illustrated both by the fact that the courts and the Board have not ac- 80. 417 U.S. at 264. For example, in NLRB v. McAllister Bros., the "new" employer used its " 'imagination and talent to initiate an unusual but effective operational change' " which basically consisted of eliminating a large number of union employees. 819 F.2d 439, 443 (4th Cir. 1987). (Technically, the argument would be that the "new" employer did not hire the predecessor's union employees.) The court had no trouble finding an alter ego relationship between the old and new employers; however, if work force were a factor, the task would be unjustifiably more difficult.
[Vol. 86:1024 cepted (nor have they considered) the above interpretation of Justice Marshall's dicta and by their divergent approaches to a motive-based standard. Part II provides an examination of this role.
II. DISAGREEMENT OVER THE ROLE OF EMPLOYER MOTIVE
Despite agreement among the courts of appeals and the NLRB on the Crawford Door criteria, 81 disagreement persists over the role of employer motive in determining alter ego status. 82 This Note places the various positions taken on motive 83 by the courts and the Board into three broad categories -"critical," "relevant, but not prerequisite," and "reasonably foreseeable benefit." Within each category, the underlying rationale and possible arguments for and against the approach are discussed. Ultimately, all of the current approaches are rejected based on the conclusion that motive is an inappropriate consideration -whether a "successor employer is in reality the same employer"84 (i.e., an alter ego) should depend on the identity of the entity itself, not on its reason for becoming that entity. An objective test based on a modified "reasonably foreseeable benefit" standard is proposed to accomplish this result.
81. See Part I.B supra.
82. "Disagreement" is an understatement -almost every court of appeals has considered the role of motive in determining alter ego status, and even though this Note groups the courts into three broad categories, there are several discrete positions within those categories. See Befort, supra note 66, at 95-98 (grouping the courts into slightly different, but equally fractured, categories).
The NLRB's position is also inconsistent:
The Board has repeatedly sidestepped the motive issue without adopting an identifiable position. Some cases suggest that the Board considers an improper motive to be a sufficient but not required basis for an alter ego finding. More frequently, the Board describes motive as an important additional factor that must be considered. Id. at 98 (footnotes omitted).
83. This Note uses the terms "motive," "intent to evade," and "anti-union animus" interchangeably. These terms encompass more than just a personal dislike of the union -;--motive 87 The NLRB itself has not taken a clear position; 88 while most of the Board's decisions apply a "relevant" standard, 89 two recent cases indicate that some NLRB members consider motive to be critical. 90 However, examination of the merits of the "critical" standard demonstrates that it is the least justifiable of the positions currently taken.
As an initial observation, the cases are almost devoid of discussion justifying the "critical" standard. 88. A precise understanding of each of the standards being applied by the Board and the courts is actually less important than the fact that no consistent and justifiable standard is currently being applied. One commentary on double-breasting is equally appropriate in traditional alter ego cases: "[l]n an area where concrete standards, applied with uniformity, are crucial to unions and employers alike, the law remains largely unascertainable." Comment, but these sources themselves fail to provide a rationale for the position, 92 and predate the alter ego cases decided in the 1980s that address the role of motive. Three of the strongest arguments supporting the standard, all of which ultimately fail, are the courts' reliance on the language of Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 93 a statement by the Eighth Circuit that appears to "temper" its position, and a possible analogy to the "runaway shop" context in which some courts of appeals allow a "business necessity" defense to a finding that a plant removal or relocation violates section 8(a)(3).9 4 At first glance it seems that those courts employing a "critical" standard most closely follow the language and holding of Southport. The Supreme Court explicitly stated the question as " [ w ] hether there was a bona fide discontinuance and a true change of ownershipwhich would terminate the duty of reinstatement created by the Board's order -or merely a disguised continuance of the old employer .... " 95 The courts following the "critical" standard have extended this language in stating that the purpose of the test is to prevent a "sham transfer of assets. " 96 Although the language of Southport might seem to support this extension, the Court's holding was limited to much narrower grounds in which the intent to evade was clear. laws," 99 and his statement that the purpose of the alter ego inquiry is to determine whether the successor employer "is in reality the same employer," 100 suggest intent is not required. At most, intent should be a "relevant" consideration in those "frequent" cases described by the Court. This Note maintains, however, that it is better to concentrate on the "same employer" language -inquiring as to whether an entity is objectively unchanged -rather than asking the reason for a technical change in corporate form.101 Proponents of the "critical" standard may attempt to justify it as simply a stronger form of the "relevant" standard. In Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union, 102 the Eighth Circuit stated:
The Sixth Circuit has recently accepted an argument that a finding of anti-union animus or "employer intent [to evade obligations under the NLRA] is not essential or prerequisite to imposition of alter ego status." NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986) .... A requirement that employer intent be demonstrated could hinder the goals of the doctrine, the Al/coast Court said: "[A]n employer who desired to avoid union obligations might be tempted to circumvent the doctrine by altering the corporations's structure based on some legitimate business reason, retaining essentially the same business and utilizing the change to escape the unwanted obligations." 780 F.2d at 582. We consider the difference between this statement and our position . . . to be largely one of degree, and note that the mere existence of "some legitimate business reason" for a change in corporate organization should not alone prevent a finding of alter ego status. 103 This argument is deficient in two respects. First, it has little force unless one accepts the proposition that intent has some role i.n an alter ego analysis. 104 the Board has no such flexibility under the Eighth Circuit's test -it can consider the Crawford Door factors "'til the cows come home," but ultimately it cannot find alter ego status without first finding an intent to evade.
A third potential justification for the "critical" standard turns on an analogy to the "runaway shop" cases, in which the employer relocates, or shifts work from a union to a nonunion plant. While " [t] here is general agreement that if the employer's move is motivated by hostility toward and a desire to escape the union, the action violates Section 8(a)(3)," 107 the Supreme Court has not spoken ,on whether animus is required, 108 and some courts of appeals have allowed a "business necessity" defense. 109 Considering intent to be a "critical" requirement in alter ego cases likewise implies that a "business necessity" defense 110 would negate an alter ego finding.
The analogy between the use of intent in "runaway shop" cases and its use in alter ego situations does not survive close examination. First, the factual context and legal consequences in which "runaway shop" and alter ego cases arise implicate different policies. In an alter ego case, the employer's argument is that the reason it is neither oblithe alter ego doctrine but here it simply is not necessary." 780 F.2d at 583. It notes that "the record shows some evidence of anti-union animus." 780 F.2d at 583 n.9. gated to bargain nor bound to its predecessor's collective bargaining contract is because it is an entirely "new" corporation. In contrast, a "runaway shop" involves the same employer -there is no contention that the employer is free of all obligations due to the relocation. Even though an employer may not have the duty to bargain with the union over its decision to shift work, it will still be bound to bargain over the effects of its decision, and may also be required to continue recognizing the union.
Second, "runaway shops" generally involve some finding of discrimination under section 8(a)(3). 111 Alter ego cases, in contrast, almost always focus on refusal-to-bargain charges under section 8(a)(5), and only sometimes involve discrimination charges under section 8(a)(3). 112 The Supreme Court set out the appropriate section 8(a)(5) standard in NLRB v. Katz. 113 In that case, the employer unilaterally changed several terms that were the subject of upcoming negotiations with the union. 114 The Court rejected the employer's argument that it had changed the terms in "good faith," stating:
A refusal to negotiate in/act as to any subject which is within § 8(d), and about which the union seeks to negotiate, violates § 8(a)(5) though the employer has every desire to reach agreement with the union upon an over-all collective agreement and earnestly and in all good faith bargains to that end. . .
. [I]t is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of § 8( a)(5) much as does a flat refusal. 115
Nothing circumvents an alter ego employer's duty to negotiate more than a flat refusal to bargain with the union on any subject. Unlike the "runaway shop" cases, in which the union continues to be recognized and bargained with, the alter ego employer -claiming to be entirely "new" -refuses to recognize the union, to bargain, and to honor its collective bargaining agreement.
Finally, even conceding that section 8(a)(3) has general applicability to alter ego cases, this does not justify the "critical" standard. The Supreme Court's holding in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Co. 116 (1967) . "Lockouts" are the counterpart to an employee strike -the employer "locks out," i.e., withholds work from, the employees as an economic weapon/response to the employees' concerted activities. Although a discussion of these cases is beyond the scope of this Note, the literature concerning "lockout" cases is extensive. See Cox, supra note 112, at 163 n.4 (listing 14 sources).
[Vol. 86:1024 ing of intent because they are inherently destructive of employee rights. In Erie Resistor, the employer decided to continue operations after its union employees went on strike. 117 It hired replacement workers, giving them "super-seniority" (by adding twenty years to the length of service) for purposes of future layoffs and recalls. 118 Nine months after the strike ended, Erie's work force was half its prestrike size, and many of the union workers without "super-seniority" had been laid off. 119 The union filed unfair-labor-practice charges under sections 8(a)(l) and (3), challenging the super-seniority plan and the resulting layoffs. 120 The NLRB's holding that specific evidence of discriminatory intent was not required was reversed by the Third Circuit.121 The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the Board, stating:
We think the Court of Appeals erred in holding that, in the absence of a finding of specific illegal intent, a legitimate business purpose is always a defense to an unfair labor practice charge .... "Some conduct may by its very nature contain the implications of the required intent; the natural foreseeable consequences of certain action may warrant the inference .... "
The outcome may well be the same [as when specific evidence of subjective intent is shown] when intent is founded upon the inherently discriminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself. The employer in such cases must be held to intend the very consequences which foreseeably and inescapably flow from his actions .... 1 22 The destructive effect of a corporate transformation on employee rights is equally evident in an examination of the policy considerations attendant to alter ego cases. 123 Thus, whether the problem is approached from a section 8(a)(3) discrimination perspective, or from that of a section 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain, 124 the "critical" standard (as well as the standards below that consider intent in some lesser degree) cannot be justified. (1965) ("[S]ome practices ... are inherently so prejudicial to union interests and so devoid of significant economic justification that no specific evidence of intent to discourage union membership or other antiunion animus is required."); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967) ("[I]f it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct was 'inherently destructive' of important employee rights, no proof of anti-union motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business considerations."). 
B. The ''Relevant, but Not Prerequisite" Standard
In contrast to the "critical" standard, seven federal courts of appeals -the Second, 125 Fifth, 126 Sixth, 127 Seventh, 128 Ninth, 129 Tenth, 130 and District of Columbia 131 Circuits -have in varying degrees adopted a standard in which "employer intent is not essential or prerequisite to imposition of alter ego status. Instead, it is merely one of the relevant factors the Board can consider .... " 132 Most of the NLRB's members have also apparently adopted this approach. 13 3 Although there are several discrete "variations on a theme" among the courts in stating the "relevant" standard, 134 the differences are not significant to analyzing the merits of this approach. The focus in this discussion will therefore center on the Sixth Circuit's thoughtful reflection on the "relevant" standard in NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, [Vol. 86:1024 Inc. 135 This subpart will show that although Allcoast overcomes many of the shortcomings of the "critical" standard, the "relevant" standard still retains the potential of failing at both extremes -erroneously failing to find alter ego status by allowing a legitimate business justification defense, and.finding alter ego status by considering animus even though the predecessor employer received no foreseeable benefit.
A brief recitation of Allcoast's facts will help in understanding the court's analysis of the "relevant" standard. The employer originally operated in the moving business under both its own Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) license and as an agent for Atlas Van Lines under Atlas's ICC license. 136 Atlas subsequently adopted a new policy prohibiting its agents from operating concurrently under their own and Atlas's licenses; however, Atlas suggested that operating the licenses under two separate corporations would be acceptable. 137 Mr. Harris, the owner, took Atlas's advice and split the predecessor corporation into two successor companies. 138 While he conceded that one of the new entities (Allcoast Transfer) was bound to the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, he claimed that the second entity (Ward Moving) was a "new" corporation and was free from all collective bargaining obligations. 1 39 There was no dispute that the Crawford Door factors were met. 140 Harris's sole contention was that intent to evade "is a prerequisite for imposition of alter ego status," 141 and that the "change in corporate form was necessitated solely by Atlas' policy change." 142 After thoroughly examining the existing standards -"critical," "relevant, but not prerequisite," and "foreseeable benefit" -Judge Contie, speaking for a unanimous court, concluded that "a finding of employer intent is not essential or prerequisite to imposition of alter ego status. Instead, it is merely one of the relevant factors .... "143 Judge Contie's arguments against adopting a "critical" standard were based on the danger of pretext and on the need for flexibility:
If we were to require a finding of employer intent, an employer who 135. 780 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1986). 136. 780 F.2d at 577. 137. 780 F.2d at 577-78. 138. 780 F.2d at 578. 139. 780 F.2d at 578. As discussed earlier, Al/coast is a nontraditional "double·breasting" case. See note 67 supra.
140. See Part l.B supra. For example, the Board found identical ownership of the corpora· tions. 780 F.2d at 582. Mr. Harris admitted, "I own both companies .••• " Brief for NLRB at 14, Al/coast (No. 84-591). As was noted earlier, however, neither the Board nor the courts re· quire absolute identity of ownership. See note 54 supra. Mr. Harris also managed both com pa· nies and made all major policy decisions. 780 F.2d at 582. In addition, both companies used their equipment interchangeably and operated out of the same facility. 780 F.2d at 578.
141. 780 F.2d at 579. 142. 780 F.2d at 579. 143. 780 F.2d at 581. desired to avoid union obligations might be tempted to circumvent the doctrine by altering the corporation's structure based on some legitimate business reason, retaining essentially the same business, and utilizing the change to escape unwanted obligations. Our flexible approach will discourage such attempts at circumvention by allowing the Board to weigh all the relevant factors .... Accordingly, even when purportedly legitimate reasons support an alteration in structure, the Board can prevent an employer from avoiding obligations under the Act. 144 The court's pretextual argument is a valid criticism of the "critical" standard, given that employers with evasive intent have in fact made this contention. 145 Unfortunately, the "flexibility" given to the Board to prevent circumvention by ''purportedly legitimate reasons" leaves open the possibility of a defense to alter ego status when there actually is a legitimate business justification. 146 As Part III maintains, legitimate employee expectations will be defeated if an entity that is "in reality the same employer," 147 determined on an objective basis, can avoid its collective bargaining obligations for any reason -including a nonlabor-related reason.14s At the other extreme, the "flexibility" provided by the Al/coast decision could potentially result in the Board's overvaluing the presence of animus -finding an alter ego relationship where there is no foreseeable benefit to the predecessor employer -contravening Textile 146. Judge Contie states, "An inquiry into employer intent may be appropriate in other situations involving application of the alter ego doctrine •... " 780 F.2d at 583. He continues, "Harris viewed a change in corporate structure as the opportunity to evade unwanted obligations under the Act.". 780 F.2d at 583 n.9. The general tenor of the court's discussion leaves open the possibility that an alter ego relationship might not be found if there were a corporate transformation in response to a legitimate business reason, even if the "new" employer were "in reality the same employer."
The Board's decision not to find alter ego status might go something like this: "Animus is relevant; there is no animus present in this case, so the employer's good faith transformation outweighs the other Crawford Door criteria which are admittedly present." But see Reply Brief for Respondent at 5, Al/coast (No. 84-5961) ("It is undoubtedly true that intent alone cannot give rise to a Section 8(a)(5) violation: an employer may unabashedly hope to 'evade his obligations under the Act' but, in the absence of sufficient organizational similarity, the employer presumably could not be deemed to be an alter ego.") (emphasis in original).
147. See text at note 76 supra.
148. To argue that the successor employer who is "in reality the same employer" should be allowed to avoid its union obligations because of a change for a nonlabor-related reason is a non sequitur. As the ALJ pointed out in Al/coast: While these circumstances may explain the decision to create Ward Moving as a separate corporation, they do not explain a totally separate and subsequent decision on Harris' part in refusing to apply ... the terms and conditions of employment which governed their performance of Atlas work prior to the change in corporate structure. [Vol. 86:1024
Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. 149 The Eighth Circuit's explanation of the relevance of motive, although in the context of the "critical" standard, provides a glimpse of this danger:
[A] number of factors, including anti-union motivation, are being treated as relevant to the question whether one employer, formally separate, should be viewed as legally the same as another. When the requisite degree of anti-union motivation is present, this question is answered "yes," even though the other factors considered might not suffice to produce this result. 1 so One example of animus overvaluation is the NLRB's decision in Denzil S. Alkire. 1 s 1 In that case, the Board overruled the ALJ's finding that, despite animus evident by both the employer and union, 1 s 2 the Supreme Court's holding in Darlington allowed the employer to go out of business. 1 s 3 The Fourth Circuit rejected the Board's finding of alter ego status based on the lack of a foreseeable benefit to the predecessor employer. 1 s 4 The Fourth Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach ....:.... which prevents the overvaluation of animus displayed by the Board in Alkire -was rejected out of hand by Judge Con tie as falling within the "critical" rubric. 1 ss If the Fourth Circuit's test unambiguously fell within this rubric, Judge Contie's rejection of the test would be appropriate; however, the test can also be applied on an objective basis, and thus deserves additional scrutiny.
C. The ''Reasonably Foreseeable Benefit" Standard
The Fourth Circuit's approach to the alter ego test is based on the concept of a "reasonably foreseeable benefit." In Alkire v. NLRB, 156 Judge Gordon, speaking for a divided court, stated the two-step analysis:
When business operations are transferred, the initial question is whether substantially the same entity controls both the old and new employer. If this control exists, then the inquiry must turn to whether the transfer resulted in an expected or reasonably foreseeable benefit to the old employer related to the elimination of its labor obligations. 157 149. 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965) ("an employer has the absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases").
150 The "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test provides an excellent foundation for overcoming the problems of both the "critical" and "relevant" standards. This section explores the court's rationale for the approach, its advantages relative to the previously discussed standards, and two ways in which it can be strengthened -first, through the explicit retention of the Crawford Door factors; 158 and second, by considering whether the change "resulted in" 159 a foreseeable benefit, regardless of the motive for that change.
In Alkire, the employer informed his employees that he was going out of business, and subsequently entered a sale-lease agreement with a successor corporation (Mountaineer) formed by a former employee for the purpose of taking over the business. 160 The sales agreement provided that, until financing was attained to complete the sale, the former owner (Alkire) would receive the net profits from the business, as well as a weekly consulting fee. 161 After a coal strike that had caused the lay-off of most of Alkire's coal-hauling truckers ended, the "new" employer, Mountaineer, refused to rehire many of the former Alkire employees, 162 resulting in section 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) charges. 1 6 3
The Administrative Law Judge found that The NLRB disagreed with the ALJ's characterization of the case as "involving, simply, an employer's right to go out ofbusiness." 165 The court concluded that the addition of a "reasonably foreseeable benefit" requirement set the proper bounds of these competing policies. 169 Regardless of whether the Fourth Circuit's test is viewed as objective or motive-based, the "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach has certain advantages over the other standards. For example, unlike the "critical" standard, the "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach comports more closely with the Supreme Court's description of the alter ego doctrine in Howard Johnson. Justice Marshall there described the doctrine as applicable to transformations designed ''frequently to avoid the effect of the labor laws." 170 The "critical" standard will allow an employer to escape alter ego status unless intent to evade is shown; yet, Justice Marshall did not describe such transformations as being designed "always" to avoid the effect of the labor laws. Likewise, a "reasonably foreseeable benefit" approach is superior to the "relevant" standard because it provides a safeguard against Board overvaluation of animus in contravention of the Supreme Court's holding in Darlington. m Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit would allow an employer to escape alter ego status if the employer had a legitimate business reason for making a change in corporate form that also resulted in a benefit related to eliminating labor obligations. Although the Alkire test's objective language appears to prevent exactly this situ- for a unanimous court, found that the predecessor employer's "elimination of . . . bargained-for employee commitments was the instrumental purpose motivating the transfer to [the successor employer]." 180 Judge Sprouse's statemen!J}:iM "imposition of alterego status under Alkire does not hinge on proof that the employer intended to evade the labor laws," 181 while dicta, demonstrates that the court might be willing to find alter ego status in spite of a transformation motivated by a nonlabor-related reason. The language of the test itself -which uses the term "resulted in," 182 rather than "motivated by," a reasonably foreseeable benefit -supports this interpretation. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's Darlington analogy must be viewed in light of the Darlington case itself. Darlington Manufacturing Company owned and operated one textile mill. 183 A majority of its stock, however, was held by the Milliken family (headed by Roger Milliken), which controlled seventeen textile manufacturers and twenty-seven mills. 184 After the union won representation at Darlington in a bitterly contested election, Milliken decided to liquidate the company.18s
The NLRB found that the closing was motivated by anti-union animus in violation of section 8(a)(3). 186 The Fourth Circuit, however, denied enforcement of the Board's order, finding an absolute right to close all or part of a business for any reason, including animus.187 Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, agreed that an employer has the right to close all of its business for any reason; however, he did not agree with the Fourth Circuit's assertion that such a right exists for a partial closure, stating, " [ "discrimination" focus of section 8(a)(3), appropriate in Darlington, is not necessary in the typical alter ego case, which involves an objective section 8(a)(5) inquiry.189 A second possible approach to reconciling the Fourth Circuit's apparently motive-based stanaard and an objective standard is simply to accept that the court will consider motive in some degree. 190 However, the analysis up to this point has shown the need for an objective inquiry, and the language of the "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test supports such an inquiry. 191 This Note suggests rewording the Fourth Circuit's "foreseeable benefit" test as follows, in order to include the Crawford Door factors explicitly and to state the objective nature of the test:
When business operations are transferred, the initial question is whether the old and new employer are the same employer in fact, given the Board's consideration of the following factors: substantially identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership. If the employers are determined by the Board to be in reality the same employer, then the inquiry must turn to whether the transfer resulted in an expected or reasonably foreseeable benefit to the old employer related to the elimination of its labor obligations, regardless of the motivation for the change in corporate form .192 Policy considerations lend further support to this modified approach.
Ill. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: ACCOMMODATING EMPLOYEE EXPECTATIONS AND EMPLOYER FREEDOM
Beyond Congress's broad mandate to "promote industrial peace and equality of bargaining power" 1 9 3 by "removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife," 194 the NLRB" and the courts are given little legislative guidance. The task of reconciling "[t]he inherent tension between entrepreneurial prerogative and employee security" 195 is thus left to the Board, 1 9 6 withjudicial oversight. 1 9 7 The policy considerations discussed in this Part -protecting legitimate employee ex- [Vol. 86:1024 pectations and delimiting employer freedom strengthen the argument for an objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" standard.
A. Protecting Legitimate Employee Expectations (Pigs Is Pigs 1 9B)
The fundamental proposition on which this Note is based ·is this: determining whether an old and a new employer are "in reality the same employer" should depend on the identity of the entity, not on its reason for becoming that entity. 199 As Professor Roger Abrams has noted, [M] anagement can try to justify anything by citing economic necessity.
[But] they can't get away from their legal responsibilities by changing the name over the door to something that looks like, sounds like, and smells like the old firm. Companies can't get rid of unions if employees want them, just as a union can't force itself on workers. 200 Preventing "industrial strife" through the protection of legitimate employee expectations can be achieved in two ways -ensuring fairness and avoiding the danger of pretext -both of which are advanced by an objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test.
It is fundamentally unfair if an employer can use a change in its corporate form -for any reason -to gain an unfair advantage over its employees. 201 There is no difference, from an employee's point of view, whether the employer changed its form for labor or nonlaborrelated reasons. Thus, the equitable principle that substance should prevail over form, 202 should be invoked in spite of the normal assumptions about limited corporate liability. 203 The "critical," "relevant,"
and motive-based "foreseeable benefit" tests all fail, from a fairness-tothe-employee viewpoint, in cases where the employer's change is motivated by nonlabor-related reasons, but the employer nonetheless changes the employee-employer relationship by rejecting its NLRA duties.
The basic issue of fairness was used by Professor Befort as an argument for rejecting the "critical" standard in his discussion of Allcoast as a "double-breasting" 204 case:
The Allcoast case illustrates the basic unfairness of predicating alter ego status upon proof of an employer's evasive intent. . . . [T]he employer ... established a new firm performing the same work in the same market but without adherence to the labor agreement. Many, if not most, of the circuit courts nonetheless would not apply the labor agreement to the new firm because of the alleged business justification for the firm's creation. Such a result ignores the legitimate contract expectations of the employees and the Board's traditional preference for contract enforcement. ... The employer's contractual responsibilities should accompany this benefit regardless of whether the new firm was created to avoid the union or merely to comply with Atlas' change in policy. 205 Allowing an employer to escape its obligations merely because its transformation was motivated by a legitimate reason not only defeats its employees' legitimate expectations, it also allows the employer to exceed its own expectations. As a signatory to the collective bargaining contract, 206 the employer could not have expected to escape the terms of its contract.
A second way of protecting legitimate employee ·expectations is by avoiding the danger of pretext. ·Except for the "critical" standard, all of the approaches discussed in Part II achieve this goal. 207 The danger of adopting intent as a prerequisite to alter ego status is the possible evasion by some employers of their collective bargaining obligations through a nonlabor-related pretext. As Judge Contie stated in Allcoast:
If we were to require a finding of employer intent, an employer who desired to avoid union obligations might be tempted to circumvent the doctrine by altering the corporation's structure based on some legitimate business reason, retaining essentially the same business, and utilizing the change to escape unwanted obligations. 208 business operations have actually ceased, there will be no foreseeable benefit to the predecessor employer. 234 It is at this point that the Burns Court's concerns about inhibiting a bona fide new employer from taking over a "motj.9und business" and bargaining according to "economic power realities" are appropriate. Darlington thus describes an employer's right to go out of business for any reason, and the foreseeable benefit test indicates at what point the employer in fact has gone out of business. In the final analysis, the Board's inquiry into whether there was an objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" to the old employer constitutes a safeguard -verifying that the Crawford Door factors were properly applied in determining alter ego status.
CONCLUSION
One of the most serious criticisms of the alter ego doctrine has been that "[t]he many cases in this area demonstrate that alter ego determinations -critical in many management rights contexts -are apt to differ unpredictably frOJil case to case, depending not only upon controlling facts but also on the predication of the adjudicating body." 235 Thus, the very flexibility that the Sixth Circuit views as a strength in arguing for the "relevant" standard 236 can also be viewed as a weakness. 237 An objective "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test provides the NLRB with flexibility by retaining discretion to weigh the seven Crawford Door factors. This captures the benefits of the flexible approach espoused by those supporting the "relevant standard." It also avoids the pitfalls of the "critical" standard, which cannot be supported on the language of Southport, on an interpretation of the standard as a 234. This statement should be interpreted as meaning "business operations have ceased in a particular line of business." For example, an employer in the textile business may decide to cease textile operations and to redeploy its capital in, e.g., computer technology or agriculture. In such a case, the Board should not find any foreseeable benefit related to the elimination of the employer's labor obligations -the employee bargaining unit no longer reflects the same "community of interests." See NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), quoted at note 4 supra. See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 1, at 282-83 (discussing criteria for determining an appropriate bargaining unit). If the NLRB has properly applied the Crawford Door and foreseeable-benefit criteria, the characteristics of the appropriate bargaining unit should be unchanged, since the same employer in fact will be in the same line of business. See Part I.B supra. (It should be noted that the NLRA does not apply at all in the field of agriculture. See note 2 supra.).
235. P. MISCIMARRA, supra note 70, at 183 (footnotes omitted). See also Comment, DoubleBreasted Operations, supra note 67, at 48 ("[I]n an area where concrete standards, applied with uniformity, are crucial to unions and employers alike, the law remains largely unascertainable.").
236. NLRB v. Allcoast Transfer, Inc., 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986). 237. As one commentator has noted in the successorship context:
[T]he Court reaffirmed the existing policy of ad hoc evolution of general criteria . . . . Therein lies Burns' greatest wisdom and, perhaps, its most telling weakness, for it permits the widest possible flexibility in the face of constantly changing factual patterns, but at the same time it diminishes predictability in an area of the law where predictable consequences are exceedingly desirable.
Slicker, supra note 64, at 1104.
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Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1024 variation on the "relevant" theme, by analogy to the "runaway shop'' cases, or on policy grounds.
Yet, at the same time, the objective "reasonably foreseeable benefir standard maintains predictability and uniformity by articulating an approach that safeguards an employer's absolute right to go out of business for any reason, including animus. This conforms with the Supreme Court's holding in Darlington. Employer motive is thus viewed as a means to an end in determining whether the old employer anticipated a foreseeable benefit, rather than as an end in itself. Finally, the language 'of the Fourth Circuit's "reasonably foreseeable benefit" test, which in its own right is capable of supporting an objective interpretation, is strengthened by the explicit rejection of "legitimate business reasons" as a ground for avoiding alter ego statusproviding an additional safeguard for the protection of legitimate employee expectations. The National Labor Relations Act's goal of promoting industrial peace -not to mention a basic sense of fairnessdemands no less.
-Gary Alan MacDonald
